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Conducting expeditionary operations means operating in foreign, and increasingly urban, cultures; foreign not simply in the sense of other countries, but cultures with which the Marine Corps has little to no understanding or even the foundation or tools to develop an understanding sufficient to conduct successful expeditionary operations. This is a critical shortfall for the Corps as the self-proclaimed "premier expeditionary `Total Force in Readiness. '" 1 The nature and complexity of recent, current and likely future missions demand a cultural intelligence capability that often has been neglected or to which has only been paid lip service. To be an effective expeditionary force in today's world, the Marine Corps must pursue an advanced cultural intelligence capability by developing it organically, contracting for it, coordinating with sister services and other agencies for a joint capability, or some combination.
Expeditionary Operations Requires Cultural Expertise
Expeditionary operations are those "conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country .
. . [that] encompass the entire range of military operations . . 
Cultural Expertise and The War on Terror
Sun Tzu's maxim, "Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total," 18 is certainly applicable to expeditionary operations in urban areas, but necessitates extension along the continuum of relative interests. This is especially true concerning the War on Terror, which is more appropriately termed a war on radical ideology. In such a war, as well as any insurgency, the battlefield of ideas replaces the traditional battlefield, and the primary weapons used are messages sent through terrorist 16 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, cited in Medby, 55. 17 Medby, [7] [8] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Grifith (Oxford, 1963) quoted in Medby, 1. acts to influence population groups. Therefore, the focus is not as much on the enemy, ground or weather, but on the targeted population groups.
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Consequently, because ideological conflict is likely to be the predominant characteristic of any urban operation, one must clearly understand the culture of those groups in order to effectively wage an information war. The requisite cultural understanding for such operations comes not merely from demographic analysis, but the application of a mature cultural intelligence capability.
Cultural Intelligence
The term cultural intelligence (CQ) has been developed primarily within the business community as a concept that Rand's description of CQ is entir6ely consistent with that of Earley and Ang. This is no small task, however, and likely may be the most challenging aspect of an operation.
Obtaining a Cultural Intelligence Capability
Effectively applying CQ in a given expeditionary operation requires the mastery of a culture that can only be achieved through the intense study and mastery of many different fields such as human reactions, the history and language of an area, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and most important, through physical immersion for a prolonged period of time in the culture.
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The question now is how does the Marine Corps obtain such a capability. 
Conclusion
Conducting successful expeditionary operations requires not merely knowledge of and limited experience with the foreign culture in which such operations are conducted, but a deep understanding of it. This is particularly true in the ideological war on terror and insurgencies in general. Such understanding can only be found in those possessing high cultural intelligence, which requires an enormous investment in time and resources in the right people. As the country's self-proclaimed premier expeditionary Total Force in Readiness, the Marine Corps must develop or otherwise obtain a CQ capability.
